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NATURAL PARENTS v.
SUPERINTENDENT OF CHILD WELFARE
By DOUGLAS SANDERS*
A. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, Indian cases have become a distinct part of the case
load of the Supreme Court of Canada. A series of hunting rights cases began
in the 1960's: Sikyea,' White and Bob,2 George,3 Sigeareak,4 Daniels,5 Car-
dina8 and Myran.7 At least three more hunting and fishing rights cases are
presently on their way to the Court.8 The question of aboriginal title to land,
argued in part in certain of the hunting cases, was directly raised in Calder v.
Attorney General of British Columbia,9 decided by the Supreme Court early
in 1973. The apparent settlement of the James Bay controversy promises to
spare the highest court that politically contentious issue.'0 Leave to appeal
has been granted in the Paulette" case, bringing certain of the aboriginal title
claims in the Northwest Territories before the Court.
The Canadian Bill of Rights cases, which began with the seemingly
simple issue in the Drybones case, 12 became increasingly involved with the
intricacies of the Indian Act. While the Drybones case can be discussed by
lawyers who know nothing of the Indian Act, the subsequent cases of Lavell,18
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[Certain of the materials in this note are derived from the author's report Family
Law and Native People prepared on contract with the Law Reform Commission of
Canada, 1975, unpublished, available for reference in the library of the Commission's
head office in Ottawa.]
I R. v. Sikyea, [19641 S.C.R. 642.
2 R. v. White and Bob (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481.
3 R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267.
4 R. v. Sigeareak, [1966] S.C.R. 645.
5R. v. Daniels, [1968] S.C.R. 517.
4 Cardinal v. Attorney General of Alberta, [1974] S.C.R. 695.
7 Myron v. R. (1975), 58 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
8 R. v. Kruger and Manuel, t1975] 5 W.W.R. 167; R. v. Derriksan, [1975] 4 W.W.R.
761; R. v. Frank, Unreported, Supreme Court of Alberta, Appellate Division, August 14,
1975.
9 [1973] S.C.R. 313.
-0 SimardBeaudry Inc. v. Kanatawat, Unreported, Quebec Court of Appeal, Novem-
ber, 1975.
11 Re Paulette's Application to file a Caveat, [1973] 6 W.W.R. 97.
12 [1970] S.C.R. 282.
13 Attorney General of Canada v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349.
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Canard4 and, most recently, the Natural Parents case15 demand a detailed
understanding of parts of Canadian Indian law and policy.
The Natural Parents case dealt with the question of whether provincial
adoption laws could be applied to the adoption of a status Indian child by
parents who did not have Indian status. The trial judge held that such an
adoption would be inconsistent with the rights and status provided for under
the Indian Act.1 The decision was reversed on appeal by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal. 17 The British Columbia Court of Appeal was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Canada.
There have been questions relating to the adoption of status Indian
children for a number of years.18 One question relates to the effect adoption
has or should have on Indian status;' 9 another matter of controversy has
been the movement of Indian children out of the native community and into
the non-native community.
In the Natural Parents case, a status Indian child was to be adopted by
a non-Indian couple. Adoption laws sever the connection between the natural
parents and the adopted child. Yet a child derives Indian status, under the
Indian Act, from his or her parents. Counsel for the natural parents argued
that adoption under provincial laws could not affect the Indian status of a
child for, if it did, the provincial law would be inconsistent with the Indian Act.
The well established view of the Department of Indian Affairs was that
provincial adoption laws could apply to status Indian children but could not
result in a child gaining or losing Indian status. In effect, they only applied
in part. Counsel for the natural parents argued against that view as well. He
argued that one category of adopting parents would be treated unequally in
comparison to other categories of adopting parents. If the child had Indian
status, then legal ties to the natural parents and a reserve community con-
tinued after the adoption. No such legal ties continued if the adopted child
did not have Indian status. Since confidentiality has been a very distinct
feature of Canadian adoption laws, one category of adoptive parents was
getting what could be considered a "second class" adoption order.20 This
discrimination, counsel argued, was incompatible with the Canadian Bill of
Rights.
14 Attorney General of Canada v. Canard (1975), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548.
15 Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, Unreported, Supreme Court
of Canada, October 7, 1975.
10 [1974] 1 W.W.R. 19.
17 (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 718.
18 See, Sanders, Family Law and Native People, Law Reform Commission of
Canada, 1975, unpublished.
10 In many ways this is the opposite question to that posed in the Lavell case, supra,
note 13. The rules relating to mixed marriages, challenged in Lavell, placed legal kinship
factors above racial factors. The rules in relation to adoption, challenged in the Natural
Parents case, placed racial factors above legal kinship factors.
20 It appears that the concern with confidentiality is lessening. One of the distinguish-
ing features of Inuit customary adoption has been the complete lack of concern for
confidentiality: see, Sanders, supra, note 18 at 62-73.
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In summary, if provincial adoption laws altered Indian status, they were
in conflict with the Indian Act. If they did not alter Indian status, they were
in conflict with the Bill of Rights. Either way they could not apply to status
Indian children, unless those children were being adopted by a status Indian
couple.
B. INDIAN STATUS AND PROVINCIAL LAW
In the Natural Parents case, it was argued that the family relationship
was "the essence" of Indian status. Chief Justice Lasldn referred to two of
the cases cited by counsel for the province as:
• .. simply illustrative of the amenability of Indians off their reservations to pro-
vincial regulatory legislation, legislation which, like traffic legislation, does not
touch their 'Indianness'. Such provincial legislation is of a different class than
adoption legislation which would, if applicable as provincial legislation simpliciter,
constitute a serious intrusion into the Indian family relationship. It is difficult to
conceive what would be left of exclusive federal power in relation to Indians if
such provincial legislation was held to apply to Indians.
The adoption law would:
... strike at a relationship integral to a matter outside of provincial competence.
The law affected Indians as Indians.
In contrast, Mr. Justice Martland ruled that the area of adoption laws,
as they affect Indians, is a double aspect area. He ruled:
I do not interpret s. 91 (24) as manifesting an intention to maintain a segregation
of Indians from the rest of the community in matters of this kind, and, accord-
ingly, it is my view that the application of the Adoption Act to Indian children
will only be prevented if Parliament, in the exercise of its powers under that sub-
section, has legislated in a manner which would preclude its application.
He ruled that the legislation did not apply to Indians as Indians for it did not
"restrict the rights of Indians."
Mr. Justice Ritchie ruled that the provincial adoption law did not affect
the "status, rights, privileges, disabilities and limitations" acquired by Indians
under the Indian Act.2' He did not state whether he felt the area of Indian
adoptions was a double aspect area which the federal government could
occupy by legislation. He went no further than explaining his view that the
provincial law did not affect the rights and status of Indian children as de-
termined by the present membership provisions of the Indian Act.
Mr. Justice Beetz approached the resolution of this issue in quite a dif-
ferent manner than the other judges. He stated:
The Indian Act, in s. 2- (1), explicitly contemplates legal adoption although it
does not otherwise provide for it. Provincial laws must therefore apply; there
are no others.
2 1 The British Columbia legislature, during the life of the Natural Parents case,
passed an amendment to the provincial adoption act which specified that it did not affect
the "status, rights, privileges, disabilities and limitations" acquired by Indians under the
Indian Act. Mr. Justice Ritchie was quoting that wording. The Judgments in the Supreme
Court of Canada varied as to whether the amendment was constitutionally valid or not.
The issue seemed to the writer to be significant and is not treated in this case note.
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He saw the application of provincial adoption laws as part of the legislative
scheme of the Indian Act. Any assessment of the character of the adoption
law, separate from that ruling, he found unnecessary. Mr. Justice Pigeon and
Mr. Justice de Grandpr6 concurred with Mr. Justice Beetz.
The "Indians as Indians" question was lost in the intricacies of a four to
three to two division of the court.
The status system in the Indian Act is primarily concerned with the
nuclear family unit and has, as an imperfectly achieved goal, the end that all
members of a nuclear family unit should have the same legal status (either
as registered Indians or not). This family orientation to the Indian Act results
in the use of the terms wife, child, legitimate child, illegitimate child, minor,
descendant, father and widow. There are no family law provisions in the
Indian Act. There are no provisions for marriage, divorce, custody, main-
tenance, adoption, legitimation or age of majority.
The Registrar appointed under the Indian Act to administer the mem-
bership system employs the following rules:
1) A marriage recognized by provincial law is recognized for the purposes
of the Indian Act and can result in the acquisition or loss of Indian status.22
2) Separation and divorce have no effect on Indian status.
3) An annulment will restore the parties to the status they had prior to the
annulled marriage.
4) Children are legitimate if they are legitimate or have been legitimated
under the provision of provincial laws. Provincial laws relating to legitimacy
can result in the acquisition or loss of Indian status.
5) The age of majority is determined by provincial law. In practice this does
not have the effect of altering the status of individual people, though the
Indian Act could be so applied as to have that result.
6) Custody has no effect on Indian status.
7) Adoption under provincial laws can result in a child being shifted from
membership in the band of his natural parents to the band of his adoptive
parents, but cannot result in either the acquisition or loss of Indian status.
The Supreme Court ruled, in the Natural Parents case, that provincial
adoption laws cannot result in the acquisition or loss of Indian status. Three
judges, in minority, left that question open.ns
What of provincial legitimation laws? The illegitimate child of a non-
22 Mr. Justice Beetz commented on this point:
One finds nothing startling in the possible impact of provincial law upon Indian
status if one keeps in mind that, in certain cases, the Indian Act makes the acquisi-
tion or loss of Indian status dependent upon marriage, (as in Attorney General of
Canada v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349), and that provincial laws relating to the
solemnization of marriages may affect the validity of the contract.
.2 Mr. Justice Beetz left the question open. His judgment was concurred in by Mr.
Justice Pigeon and Mr. Justice do Grandpr6.
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Indian mother and a status Indian father will not be registered on birth as
an Indian. If the parents subsequently marry, the child will be legitimated by
that marriage and both the mother and child will gain status. The common
law never recognized adoption, but always recognized a distinction between
legitimacy and illegitimacy. To introduce adoption by statute is to substantially
alter the common law. To modify the concept of legitimacy by adding legiti-
mation by a subsequent marriage does not introduce a dramatically new con-
cept into the law. It is the writer's view that the distinction between adoption
and legitimation laws, historical and social as it is, is sufficiently real to justify
a court separating the two and upholding the present practices of the Registrar
in relation to legitimacy.
The judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada differ on why provincial
adoption laws apply to Indians. Chief Justice Laskin, for himself and three
others, ruled that the provincial adoption law would not apply on its own to
Indians, but has been incorporated by reference by s. 88 of the Indian Act
and made to apply as federal law. Mr. Justice Martland and Mr. Justice
Ritchie both ruled that the provincial adoption law would apply to Indians
of its own strength and did not affect any rights established under the Indian
Act. Mr. Justice Beetz ruled that the provincial adoption law applied of its
own strength to Indians. He saw that as implicit in the Indian Act itself. He
left the question open whether adoption by non-Indian parents would termi-
nate the status of an Indian child; that question, he said, could only be de-
termined by the procedures set out in the Indian Act and appeals through the
federal court system.
C. THE MYSTERY OF SECTION 88
Section 88 of the Indian Act reads as follows:
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of the Parliament of Canada,
all laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are
applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that
such laws are inconsistent with this Act or any order, rule, regulation or by-law
made thereunder, and except to the extent that such laws make provision for any
matter for which provision is made by or under this Act.
The section was enacted in 1951. Shortly after the enactment of the section,
an Alberta District Court Judge commented:
Section 87 (now 88) is a new section, not appearing in any of the prior legislation
affecting Indians. It seems to be a clarification and restatement of previous case
law which, in so far as offences against provincial statutes are concerned, is found
mainly in these cases: R. v. Hill (1907), 15 O.L.R. 406; R. v. Beboning (1908),
13 Can. C.C. 51, (1923) 3 D.L.R. 414, 33 Man. R. 139; R. v. Cooper (1925),
44 Can. C.C. 314, 35 B.C.R. 457; R. v. Groslouis, 81 Can. C.C. 167, (1944) Rev.
Leg. 12.24
The view that s. 88 was a mere "clarification and restatement" was challenged
by Lysyk in his leading article in the Canadian Bar Review in 1967. While
seeing it in part as a codification of existing law, he felt that there were in-
24 R. v. Shade (1952), 102 C.C.C. 316 at 317-18, District Court Judge Feir.
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stances in which it would make certain laws apply to Indians which otherwise
would not apply:
... section 87 [now 88] would seem to have at least one (albeit limited) effect.
Reference was made above to authority for the proposition that a provincial law,
even though of general application, would not apply to a federally incorporated
company in certain circumstances, such as a provincial enactment which would
have the effect of interfering with the status and capacity of the federal company.
By analogy a particular provincial law of general application may be such as
would be characterized as a law so affecting the essential status, capacities and
activities of Indians as to be inapplicable to them (or ultra vires to the extent the
provincial law purported to apply to Indians). By the force of section 87, pre-
sumably such law would now be made applicable to Indians. 25
In other words, provincial laws which would not apply to Indians because
they dealt with Indians as Indians would be the only laws affected by s. 88.
By the section, those laws would now apply to Indians.
Section 88 appeared to play a role in certain of the hunting rights cases.
Whether that role is vital can probably be expected to be determined when
the Supreme Court of Canada decides the appeal from R. v. Kruger and
Manuel.2'
In 1971 an Ontario District Court Judge, citing the earlier Alberta
District Court decision, referred to s. 88 as designed to "further clarify the
situation."2 7
The Manitoba Court of Appeal, in Nelson v. Childrens Aid Society of
Eastern Manitoba,2 8 while agreeing with the decision of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal in the Natural Parents case, seemed to rely on s. 88 to make
the Manitoba Child Welfare Act apply to Indians.
The view that s. 88 was a restatement, a clarification or a codification
of existing law finds support in certain judgments in the Supreme Court de-
cision in the Natural Parents case. Mr. Justice Martland described the section
as a "statement of the extent to which provincial laws apply to Indians" and
concurred in the following statement of the British Columbia Court of Appeal:
In my opinion, Sec. 88 does not have the effect of converting provincial legislation
to federal legislation whenever it applies to Indians. See. 88 simply defines the
obligation of obedience that Indians owe to provincial legislation. Parliament is
neither delegating legislative power to the province nor adopting provincial legisla-
tion as its own by declaring in Sec. 88 what was true before See. 88 existed,
namely, that Indians are not only citizens of Canada but also are citizens of the
province in which they reside and are in general to be governed by provincial
laws. 20
21;Lysyk, The Unique Constitutional Position of the Canadian Indian (1967), 45
Can. Bar Rev. 513 at 539.
20 Supra, note 8. Section 88 may have played a vital role in White and Bob, supra,
note 2. See, also, R. v. Discon and Baker (1968), 67 D.L.R. (2d) 619, which is identical
on its facts to the Kruger and Manuel case.
27 District Court Judge Little in R. v. Pawis, [1972] 2 O.R. 516 at 520.
28 [1975] 5 W.W.R. 45.
20 Supra, note 17 at 722.
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Mr. Justice Ritchie made two statements on the meaning of s. 88:
In my view, when the Parliament of Canada passed the Indian Act it was con-
cerned with the preservation of the special status of Indians and with their rights
to Indian lands, but it was made plain by s. 88 that Indians were to be governed
by the laws of their province of residence except to the extent that such laws are
inconsistent with the Indian Act or relate to any matter for which provision is
made under that Act.
And, at the end of his judgment:
In the light of the above, I am of the opinion that s. 88 of the Indian Act should
be construed as meaning that the provincial laws of general application therein
referred to apply of their own force to the Indians resident in the various Prov-
inces. Accordingly, in my view, the Adoption Act here in question applies to the
Indians resident in the Province of British Columbia just as it does to the other
residents of that Province.
Mr. Justice Beetz expressed no opinion on the effect of s. 88. Mr. Justice
Pigeon and Mr. Justice de Grandpr6 concurred with Mr. Justice Martland on
the meaning and effect of s. 88, otherwise concurring with Mr. Justice Beetz.
In summary, four judges ruled that s. 88 represented an incorporation by
reference of certain provincial laws which would not otherwise apply to In-
dians (those which deal with Indians as Indians). Those laws apply to Indians
as federal laws. Four judges ruled that s. 88 represented a restatement, a
codification or a clarification of existing law and not an incorporation by
reference. They ruled that the Adoption Act applied to Indians as provincial
law. One judge made no comment on the meaning or effect of s. 88.
The argument that s. 88 merely codifies the law appears to avoid the
complexities of the section. On the other hand, there seem to be serious prob-
lems with the position presented by Lysyk and Chief Justice Laskin. Did the
drafters of s. 88 seriously intend that provincial legislation which affected the
"status, rights, privileges, disabilities and limitations"20 of Indians should now
apply to them? If Chief Justice Laskin is right that adoption under provincial
laws strikes at the root of Indianness, then the legal analysis parallels exactly
the nature of the concern of Indian leaders on the question. The loss of status
Indian children into non-Indian families weakens even further the link between
Indian status and Indian culture. It therefore threatens the basic Indian
political goal of distinct group survival. Yet both the legal and Indian charac-
terization of the adoption laws as hitting at Indianness is dismissed because of
s. 88. Surely that was not the legislative intent.
D. THE BILL OF RIGHTS ARGUMENT
The British Columbia Court of Appeal disposed of the Bill of Rights
argument on alternative grounds. They ruled that the Adoption Act applied
to Indian children as provincial legislation. It was not incorporated by refer-
ence by s. 88 of the Indian Act and made to apply to them as a federal law.
The Bill of Rights did not apply to provincial laws. Secondly, they ruled that
the allegation of discrimination or inequality could not be sustained:
a0 See, supra, note 21.
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.. . in the light of the acknowledgment by counsel for the respondents that the
Indian Act is valid legislation and does not contravene the Canadian Bill of
Rights.51
Surely the Court was remiss in reading so much into that general statement
of counsel. Counsel was, in the alternative, challenging the effect of particular
provisions of the Indian Act as in conflict with the Bill of Rights. Counsers
statement that the Indian Act as a whole was valid legislation should not have
detracted from the limited challenge being made.
The Supreme Court of Canada divided on the Bill of Rights argument.
Chief Justice Laskin, for himself, Judson, Spence and Dickson, stated:
The Court did not call upon the respondents or the intervenors to make sub-
missions on the Canadian Bill of Rights, being of the opinion that, on the assump-
tion that the Adoption Act, by referential incorporation, is federal legislation,
there was nothing in it to bring any of the prescriptions of the Canadian Bill of
Rights into play. I would in this connection adopt the remarks of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal on this issue.
The five remaining members of the Court ruled that the adoption law applied
as provincial legislation and therefore found it unnecessary to comment on
the Bill of Rights argument.
The decision is an interesting contrast to that in Drybones. There the
Court focused its attention completely on the Bill of Rights without any ex-
amination of the history or purpose of the liquor sections of the Indian Act.
In Natural Parents, the Bill of Rights argument was treated summarily and
the judgments are almost exclusively concerned with the Indian Act and the
constitutional questions.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The result in the Natural Parents case is correct in the very practical
sense that neither the Indian communities nor the non-Indian communities
were prepared to handle Indian child care outside the established provincial
framework. A judicial determination that provincial adoption laws did not
apply to status Indian children would have prompted considerable pressure
to reverse the ruling by federal legislation.
After the post-war "baby boom", the birth rate among the English and
French populations in Canada dropped dramatically. During the whole post-
war period, in contrast, Indian population increase has continued to be strong.
Non-Indian Canada used to face a situation where there were more children
available for adoption or foster care placement than homes to receive them.
During that period it was common knowledge that racially different children
had the least chance of placement. In the last ten to twenty years there has
been a gradual increase in acceptance of inter-racial adoption by non-Indian
couples and a decline in the availability of English Canadian and French
Canadian children. The increase in the number of native children in care and
the number of native child placements with non-Indian families has now co-
incided with a cultural awakening among the native population in Canada.
31 Supra, note 17 at 722.
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White institutional attitudes have always favoured the integration of the native
population. Gradually and reluctantly provincial child welfare programmes
have been responding to the Indian cultural revival by modifying their purely
integrationist posture. There is now limited provincial support for Indian run
group homes for native children and special programmes to locate native
homes for native children.
It is in this general context that the Natural Parents case and the parallel
challenge in the Nelson case 2 in Manitoba occurred. Both the Nelson case
and the Natural Parents case had some support from Indian organizations in
their provinces. They presented opportunities for Indian organizations to work
with the provincial governments on alternatives to the primarily integrationist
thrust of provincial child welfare laws and policies. But the Indian community
did not have sufficient unity or organization to adequately respond to the
opportunity. In the end, the native organizations did not use the occasion of
the litigation to put forward any proposals on child welfare programmes.3 3
The same criticism can be directed to the governments involved. The
government of British Columbia and the Union of British Columbia Indian
Chiefs jointly sponsored a small scale study which gave a very useful overview
of the situation.34 The provincial interest in Indian group homes, which had
existed for a number of years, continued.35 A regional pilot project to locate
Indian homes for Indian children was initiated. It was run by the Union of
British Columbia Indian Chiefs and involved a staff person seconded from
the Department of Indian Affairs and funding from the provincial Department
of Human Resources. The pilot project ended abruptly in the spring of 1975
when the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs rejected all government
funding and terminated its programmes. Since that time there has been no in-
dication of interest on the part of the provincial government in reviving the
project.
The Indian concern with distinct group survival was not argued in the
Natural Parents case, though the concern with cultural survival can be seen
as part of the Laskin analysis that adoption would affect Indians as Indians.
Non-Indian goals of integration, whether argued or not, appear in certain of
the judgments. Chief Justice Laskin indicated a reluctance to come to a con-
clusion that excluded Indian children from possible adoption, unless "clearly
compelled to do so by unambiguous legislation." Mr. Justice Martland, as
earlier quoted, stated that federal jurisdiction over Indians did not manifest
"an intention to maintain a segregation of Indians from the rest of the com-
munity in matters of this kind ..... The application of the provincial adoption
3 2 Supra, note 28.
a3 The native women's organizations showed more interest in the issue although
none of those organizations became involved in any way in either the Nelson or Natural
Parents cases. Some information on the activities of the native women's organizations
around this issue is found in Sanders, supra, note 18, chapter 4.
S4 Gene Elmore, Sharon Clark, Sharon Dick, A Survey of Adoption and Child
Welfare Services to Indians of B.C., February 18, 1974, unpublished.
35 See, Gibson, A Small and Charming World (Collins, 1972) at 56, 57, and 61
for an account of the establishment of one such home.
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law to Indian children made it possible for them to have the "same right to
become adopted as that of all other children in the province." The best state-
ment of the values of cultural survival and equality or integration came in the
judgment of Mr. Justice Matas of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in the Nelson
case:
As part of the argument as to deprivation of status and consequential invalidity
of the Act as it affects Indians, it was said that placing an Indian child in a non-
Indian home would weaken or sever the child's ties with his culture and heritage
and would create problems of identity for the children. To support this submission
counsel relief on the affidavits of Mr. Nelson and that of Jocelyn Brayere.
The questions raised in these affidavits were not explored in depth, nor was
it suggested that Indian children in non-Indian foster or adoptive homes were in a
different position than any Indian children living in a non-Indian environment
generally.
As well, the opinions expressed by Nelson and Bruyere are not universally
shared. For example, by agreement between Canada and Manitoba, provincial
child care services have been made available to Indians, as defined in the agree-
ment. The Rousseau River band (of which applicants and their children are
members) expressed its views about the society's program, in a resolution passed
by the band council on 29th July 1964. By that resolution the council expressed
its agreement with the society entering its program onto the Rousseau River re-
serve for the benefit of band members and agreed to support the program, to
promote its acceptance and work in liaison with the society.
The logical result of the applicants' argument would be to deprive Indian
children of the opportunities which non-Indian children have in Manitoba for the
full range of child care services.
In my opinion, this aspect of appellants' argument does not warrant declaring
the provincial legislation to be ultra vires as it affects Indians. 6
The technical character of the issues argued in the Natural Parents case
did not correspond well to the issues as they would have been perceived by
Indian people or by provincial child welfare officials. While the decision must
be treated as correct for both legal and administrative reasons, it retains a
somewhat unreal character. In the end, little light is shed on the technical
issues around which the Supreme Court judgments focus. Additionally, those
issues are isolated from the political and social realities behind the litigation.
30 Supra, note 28 at 50-51.
[VOL. 14, NO. 2
